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INTRODUCTION 
The government of Sudan is nearing completion of the Merowe 
Dam, a large hydroelectric dam north of Khartoum, Sudan’s capital.1 
Reports differ, but at the Dam’s completion, the reservoir behind it 
will stretch to approximately 175 kilometers in length.2 To 
accommodate the vast size of the reservoir, the government of Sudan 
is displacing approximately 60,000 people.3 As most are not leaving 
Sudan, they will join the ranks of the world’s twenty-four million 
internally displaced persons (“IDPs”).4 A U.N. Special Rapporteur to 
 1. See Advocacy Group Calls to Suspend Merowe Dam Construction, SUDAN 
TRIB., Mar. 23, 2006, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article14670 
[hereinafter Suspend Merowe Dam Construction] (observing that the Dam is the 
largest hydroelectric project being built in Africa today); Simon Apiku, New Dam 
to Power Sudan from Next Year, REUTERS, Aug. 15, 2007, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSMCD541789 (reporting that two 
of the of Dam’s ten turbine units will be online in 2008 for a total production of 
250 megawatts of electricity, and the other eight will be operational by the end of 
2009). 
 2. Compare Suspend Merowe Dam Construction, supra note 1 (stating that 
the reservoir will extend 200 kilometers), with PETER BOSSHARD & NICHOLAS 
HILDYARD, INT’L RIVERS NETWORK, A CRITICAL JUNCTURE FOR PEACE, 
DEMOCRACY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT: SUDAN AND THE MEROWE/HAMADAB DAM 
PROJECT: REPORT FROM A VISIT TO SUDAN AND A FACT-FINDING MISSION TO THE 
MEROWE DAM PROJECT § 3 (2005), http://internationalrivers.org/files/050428 
merowe.pdf [hereinafter FACT-FINDING MISSION] (estimating that the reservoir 
will extend 174 kilometers). 
 3. See Press Release, United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights 
[UNHCHR], U.N. Expert Urges Sudan to Respect Human Rights of Communities 
Affected by Hydro-Electric Dam Projects (Aug. 27, 2007), available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/E8A869684389FFA0C12573
44005DD01D?opendocument [hereinafter UNHCHR Press Release] (noting that 
women, children, and the elderly are among the over 60,000 people whom the 
project will displace); see also FACT-FINDING MISSION, supra note 2, § 6 (stating 
that the project will displace 9,500 families, for an estimated total of 50,000 
people); Edmund Sanders, The World: Fears of Another Darfur: As Tensions Flare 
over Proposed Dams, Many Predict Sudan's Nubia Region Will Be the Next to 
Erupt in Violence, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2007, at A1 (predicting that the waters 
will displace 70,000 people). 
 4. See INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT MONITORING CENTRE & NORWEGIAN 
REFUGEE COUNCIL, INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT: GLOBAL OVERVIEW OF TRENDS 
AND DEVELOPMENTS IN 2006 6 (Anne Glusker ed., 2007), available at 
http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/925151 
0E3E5B6FC3C12572BF0029C267/$file/Global_Overview_2006.pdf [hereinafter 
INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT] (listing statistics on IDPs and indicating that Africa is 
the most affected continent); see also U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], 
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Sudan has called for work on the Dam to stop until the government 
of Sudan guarantees the safety of those affected.5
This Comment explores the actions of Sudan’s government as it 
displaces its citizens to complete the Merowe Dam project. Part II 
provides background information on IDPs and Sudan’s experience 
with IDPs.6 Part II also introduces the relevant instruments of 
international law addressing IDPs, including the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”),7 the International 
Covenant on Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”),8 
the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (“Guiding 
Principles”),9 and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (“ICC”).10 Finally, Part II discusses the Merowe Dam project 
and the flaws in its implementation.11 Part III argues that Sudan is 
violating, among other things, provisions of the ICCPR and ICESCR 
as well as the Guiding Principles.12 Part III also argues that  
Comm’n on Human Rights, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: Report 
of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, Submitted 
Pursuant to Commission Resolution 1997/39, Intro., ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 11, 1998) (prepared by Francis M. Deng) 
[hereinafter Guiding Principles] (defining internally displaced persons as “persons 
or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their 
homes or places of habitual residence . . . and who have not crossed an 
internationally recognized State border”). 
 5. See UNHCHR Press Release, supra note 3 (urging the government of 
Sudan to adhere to accepted international standards in carrying out the Merowe 
Dam project, encouraging nations funding the project to ensure that the project 
does not violate human rights, imploring the companies involved in the 
construction of the dam to stop their work until the project’s impact on human 
rights can be examined, and calling for an independent review by U.N. human 
rights monitors). 
 6. See discussion infra Part II (explaining the criteria for labeling people as 
IDPs and describing Sudan’s extensive IDP problem). 
 7. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 8. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
 9. Guiding Principles, supra note 4. 
 10. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, June 15-July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 11. See discussion infra Part II (presenting benefits of the Dam such as 
increased availability of electrical power in Sudan and the problems the Dam and 
its implementation present such as dangerous downstream water level variance). 
 12. See discussion infra Part III (specifying provisions of the Guiding 
Principles such as the right to choose one’s place of residence and the right to an 
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Principle 6(2)(c) of the Guiding Principles is too vague and that the 
principle does not provide enough guidance for evaluating large 
development projects as a legitimate source of displacement.13 Part 
III concludes by arguing that Article 7 of the Rome Statute gives the 
ICC the power to prosecute those responsible for the displacements 
in Sudan.14
Part IV recommends the establishment of a framework of 
regulations for Guiding Principle 6(2)(c) that elucidate the 
requirements for a justified forced relocation for a development 
project.15 Part IV also recommends that Sudan adhere to international 
law as it undertakes the Merowe Dam project.16 Part IV concludes by 
advocating prosecution of those who are responsible for the 
displacements under Article 7 of the Rome Statute.17
I. BACKGROUND 
IDPs are a worldwide problem.18 The Guiding Principles 
recognize IDPs as a population distinct from traditional refugees and 
seek to apply some of the protections of international instruments to 
IDPs.19 When large development projects cause internal 
adequate standard of living). 
 13. See discussion infra Part III (exploring the ambiguity of Principle 6(2)(c)’s 
proportionality test, which weighs the aggregate benefits of the project against the 
injury to those the project will displace). 
 14. See discussion infra Part III (detailing the procedure for U.N. Security 
Council review of a suspected human rights abuse and eventual referral to the U.N. 
Special Prosecutor in the event of such abuse). 
 15. See discussion infra Part IV (recommending that the Guiding Principles 
require that those displaced by large development projects benefit directly from the 
project that displaced them). 
 16. See discussion infra Part IV (urging Sudan to provide IDPs with an 
adequate standard of living). 
 17. See discussion infra Part IV (challenging the ICC’s propensity to refuse to 
admit internal displacement cases). 
 18. See Roberta Cohen & Francis M. Deng, Introduction, in THE FORSAKEN 
PEOPLE: CASE STUDIES OF THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED 1, 1 (Roberta Cohen & 
Francis M. Deng eds., 1998) (recognizing that the number of nations affected by 
IDPs grew from eleven in 1982 to thirty-five in 1997); see also INTERNAL 
DISPLACEMENT, supra note 4, at 6 (reporting that by 2006, IDPs affected fifty-two 
countries). 
 19. See Bill Frelick, Aliens in Their Own Land: Protection and Durable 
Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons, in WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 1998 30, 
32 (1998) (reflecting on the Guiding Principles’ definition of IDPs and focus on 
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displacement, the Guiding Principles present a proportionality test 
for determining the acceptability of the displacements.20 As a large 
development project, such a test applies to the Merowe Dam 
project.21 Forced displacement without adequate justification can 
constitute a crime against humanity, which allows the ICC to 
prosecute those responsible.22
A. IDPS AND SUDAN’S ONGOING PROBLEMS WITH IDPS 
Historically, international instruments have not adequately 
protected IDPs, and this remains true today.23 In the absence of 
binding law to specifically protect IDPs, national and international 
bodies have had difficulty determining which human rights 
guarantees apply to IDPs and how to apply them effectively.24 
protection of those displaced as opposed to the location of those displaced in order 
to best provide for IDPs). 
 20. See WALTER KÄLIN, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON 
INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT: ANNOTATIONS 17 (2000) (positing that for a large 
development project causing displacement to proceed, Guiding Principle 6(2)(c) 
provides that the project must meet the “requirements of necessity and 
proportionality” to show “compelling or overriding public interests”); see also 
WORLD BANk, THE WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL MANUAL: OPERATIONAL 
POLICIES: INVOLUNTARY RESETTLEMENT para. 2(a) (2001), available at 
http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/Institutional/Manuals/OpManual.nsf/toc2/CA2D01
A4D1BDF58085256B19008197F6?OpenDocument [hereinafter OP 4.12] 
(clarifying the World Bank’s policy on involuntary resettlement by permitting 
development projects provided that all viable alternatives are explored in the 
interest of avoiding displacement). 
 21. See discussion infra Part II.B.2 (outlining the benefits of the Merowe Dam 
project weighing against the harm of the displacements the project is causing); see 
also SUDAN TRIBUNE, supra note 1 (addressing the far-reaching impact of the 
Merowe Dam project, the largest hydroelectric dam project underway in Africa, on 
the environment of Sudan). 
 22. See Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 7(1)(d) (listing forcible transfer of 
population as a crime against humanity prosecuted by the ICC). 
 23. See THOMAS G. WEISS & DAVID A. KORN, INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT: 
CONCEPTUALIZATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES, at xvii (Routledge 2006) 
(describing present efforts within the U.N. to protect IDPs as “frustratingly 
inadequate”); see also Cohen & Deng, supra note 18, at 1-2 (recognizing the lack 
of a protection mechanism for IDPs despite the global impact of internal 
displacement). 
 24. See ROBERTA COHEN & FRANCIS M. DENG, MASSES IN FLIGHT: THE 
GLOBAL CRISIS OF INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT 74 (1998) [hereinafter MASSES IN 
FLIGHT] (noting that “internally displaced persons do not forfeit their inherent 
rights because they are displaced,” but the method for protecting these inherent 
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Existing instruments of international law continue to protect IDPs.25 
Such international instruments must compete with state 
sovereignty—the concept that an international body should not 
regulate activities taking place within a state’s borders.26 However, 
this attitude is beginning to change, with the concept of sovereignty 
impressing upon nations a responsibility to respect their citizens.27 
An instance in which a state cannot or will not respect the human 
rights of its citizens raises the possibility that the international 
community will intervene.28 In cases involving IDPs, this is often 
necessary because relying on the government that displaced the IDPs 
to protect them is impracticable.29 As a response to abuse of 
rights has proven elusive). 
 25. See generally id. at 73-122 (providing an overview of the framework for 
protection of IDPs which includes such documents as the ICCPR, ICESCR, the 
Geneva Convention of 1949, and the International Labor Organization 
Conventions). 
 26. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1 (acknowledging the importance of 
sovereignty by stating that “the principle of the sovereign equality of all its 
Members” is the foundation of the United Nations); see also WEISS & KORN, supra 
note 23, at 5 (admitting that nations have viewed sovereignty as a pretense for 
acting with impunity with respect to their citizens). 
 27. See WEISS & KORN, supra note 23, at 3 (distilling the concept of sovereign 
responsibility into two component parts: the responsibility of states to protect their 
citizens’ human rights and an international responsibility to intervene when states 
fail to do so); see also Friedrich Kratochwil, Sovereignty as Dominium: Is There a 
Right of Humanitarian Intervention?, in BEYOND WESTPHALIA?: STATE 
SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION 21, 42 (Gene M. Lyons & 
Michael Mastanduno eds., 1995) (arguing that there is a right to state intervention 
“when such interventions are based on the institution of the protection of nationals, 
or on the measures taken under Chapter VII of the [U.N.] Charter”). 
 28. See, e.g., U.N. Sec. Council, Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on Darfur, Report of 
the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the Secretary-General,  
¶ 569, U.N. Doc. S/2005/60 (Feb. 1, 2005) [hereinafter Darfur Inquiry] (imploring 
the international community to act when Sudan did not act to stop the atrocities in 
Darfur); see also CATHERINE PHUONG, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF 
INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS 214 (2004) (insisting that protection of 
individual human rights is now an international concern); Jeff Nicolai, Comment, 
Operation Murambatsvina: A Crime Against Humanity Under the Rome Statute?, 
21 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 813, 835 (2006) (referring to international protection of 
citizens when sovereign governments fail to protect them as an “emerging 
principle” of international law). 
 29. See, e.g., Luke T. Lee, Current Development, The London Declaration of 
International Law Principles on Internally Displaced Persons, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 
454, 457 (2001) (analogizing the situation of state governments protecting IDPs to 
wolves guarding chicken coops). 
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sovereignty, the international community has developed means of 
prosecuting individuals who allegedly are responsible for causing 
unlawful internal displacements.30
Sudan has the highest population of IDPs in the world.31 Sudan’s 
nearly twenty-year civil war and ensuing humanitarian crises led to 
many of the displacements.32 Unlike these cases, the Merowe Dam 
presents an unambiguous case of a government’s directly displacing 
persons for a development project it has undertaken.33
B. THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND THE PRINCIPLE 6(2)(C) 
PROPORTIONALITY TEST 
The Guiding Principles provide protection for displaced persons 
and seek to avoid displacement altogether.34 There are exceptions to 
the Guiding Principles’ proscription of displacement, one of which 
allows displacement resulting from large development projects if the 
 30. See Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 7 (calling “deportation or forcible 
transfer of population,” whether internal or international, a crime against humanity 
falling within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court); cf. Nicolai, 
supra note 28, at 816-17 (explaining that the ICC can still have jurisdiction over 
countries not party to the Rome Statute if the U.N. Security Council “refers the 
situation to [the] ICC prosecutor”). 
 31. See INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT, supra note 4, at 6 (indicating Sudan’s 
5,355,000 IDPs places it first globally in internal displacement). 
 32. See Marco Simons, The Emergence of a Norm Against Arbitrary Forced 
Relocation, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 95, 108-09 (2002) (explaining that the 
civil war is a result of tensions between an Islamic government and a non-Muslim 
rebel army, and the displacements are the result of the elimination of squatters 
around Khartoum and villages around oil fields). See generally Hiram A. Ruiz, The 
Sudan: Cradle of Displacement, in THE FORSAKEN PEOPLE, supra note 18, at 139, 
139-74 (recognizing that internal displacement has affected Sudan more heavily 
than nearly all other nations in the twentieth century and describing the 
geographical, racial, political, and economic geneses of the issue). 
 33. See Dams Implementation Unit, Merowe Dam Project: Resettlement, 
http://merowedam.gov.sd/en/social.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2008) [hereinafter 
Resettlement] (discussing the relocation procedures Sudan proposes for those 
displaced, indicating that the government is aware that the Merowe Dam project is 
displacing people). 
 34. See generally Jean-Philippe Lavoyer, Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement: A Few Comments on the Contribution of International 
Humanitarian Law, 38 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 467, 467-80 (1998), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57jpg9 (recognizing that the 
Guiding Principles’ emphasis on avoiding displacement altogether is a 
reaffirmation of international humanitarian law concerning IDPs). 
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projects provide sufficient benefits for the public.35 Therefore, the 
displacements caused by the Merowe Dam project warrant an 
analysis of the proposed benefits of the Dam under Guiding  
Principle 6(2)(c).36
1. The Guiding Principles Generally and Principle 6(2)(c) 
Addressing Large Development Projects 
The Guiding Principles address the proper treatment of IDPs in all 
stages of displacement.37 IDPs do not receive the same protections as 
refugees,38 but they are equally, if not more, in need of such 
protections.39 The purpose of the Guiding Principles is to clarify and 
complete the protections that existing international instruments 
provide.40 This close relationship between the Guiding Principles and 
 35. See Simons, supra note 32, at 146 (assessing the legality of forced 
relocation by positing that relocation must not be “based on an arbitrary purpose or 
process,” but rather on a public purpose compelling enough to justify the 
relocations); see also Maria Stavropoulou, The Right Not to be Displaced, 9 AM. 
U.J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 689, 729 (1994) (intimating that the international 
community views development-induced displacements differently than 
displacements resulting from violence or other human rights violations). 
 36. See discussion infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the potential benefits of the 
Merowe Dam project to the Sudanese people). 
 37. See KÄLIN, supra note 20, at 2 (presenting the phases of internal 
displacement as “protection against displacement; protection during displacement; 
. . . [provision of] humanitarian assistance; and protection during return, 
resettlement, and reintegration”). 
 38. See PHUONG, supra note 28, at 25 (proposing that legal protection of 
refugees is a “surrogate protection,” in which the international community assumes 
the responsibility for providing protection that would otherwise have been the 
responsibility of the home state, whereas protection of IDPs is a “complementary 
protection” that coexists with state protections, and contending that the 
categorizations should remain distinct to avoid diluting existing refugee 
protections); see also Francis M. Deng, Section Three: International Processes: 
Divided Nations: The Paradox of National Protection, 603 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 217, 218 (2006) (noting that although the state is often the cause 
of internal displacement, the international community considers protection of IDPs 
to be the state’s responsibility). 
 39. See PHUONG, supra note 28, at 7 (noting that IDPs often live with poorer 
conditions and higher death rates than refugees because they are frequently 
inaccessible to aid agencies). 
 40. See id. at 58 (explaining that in addition to restating general norms of 
protection, the Guiding Principles apply them specifically to IDPs); see also 
KÄLIN, supra note 21, at v (stating that the Guiding Principles address “gray areas 
and gaps” in existing international law). 
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existing international law allows the Guiding Principles to serve an 
indicative function41—when a party fails to respect the nonbinding 
Guiding Principles, the party typically violates binding international 
law as well.42 Although the Guiding Principles are not binding 
international law, both states and non-state actors widely respect 
them.43
Section One of Principle Six of the Guiding Principles proscribes 
arbitrary displacement.44 Section Two of Principle Six presents a 
non-exhaustive list of situations in which the Guiding Principles 
prohibit displacement, including large-scale development projects, 
while still allowing some exceptions.45 Read as a corollary, large 
 41. See Lavoyer, supra note 34, at 467-68 (explaining that the Guiding 
Principles incorporate elements of “international humanitarian law, human rights 
law, and refugee law,” suggesting that the Guiding Principles draw attention to the 
synergies of these bodies of law with the protection of IDPs). 
 42. See Guiding Principles, supra note 4, princ. 5 (cementing the close 
relationship between the Guiding Principles and international law by requiring 
conformity with the latter). 
 43. See, e.g., WEISS & KORN, supra note 23, at 109-10 (citing Liberia, Sri 
Lanka, and Burundi, among others, as states that have issued policies and made 
declarations based on the Guiding Principles); Francis M. Deng, International 
Response to Internal Displacement: A Revolution in the Making, HUM. RTS. BRIEF, 
Spring 2004, at 24, 25 (lauding the extension of the invocation of the Guiding 
Principles’ application past states to non-state actors such as the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement/Army, a rebel group that considered the Guiding Principles 
in establishing its own rules on IDPs); Hanna Entwisle, Tracing Cascades: The 
Normative Development of the U.N. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 
19 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 369, 370-71 (2005) (stating that the Guiding Principles have 
become “surprisingly influential” in a short time span and underscoring the 
significant international attention paid to “contravention” of the Guiding Principles 
despite their nonbinding status); Pooja Mehta, Comment, Internally Displaced 
Persons and the Sardar Sarovar Project: A Case for Rehabilitative Reform in 
Rural India, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 613, 621-23 (2005) (recognizing the 
emergence of a normative framework, outlined by the Guiding Principles, for 
protection of IDPs as the result of the failure of the international community to 
produce an agreement similar to the 1951 Refugee Convention). 
 44. See Guiding Principles, supra note 4, princ. 6 (“Every human being shall 
have the right to be protected against being arbitrarily displaced from his or her 
home or place of habitual residence.”); see also KÄLIN, supra note 20, at 14 
(noting that the Guiding Principles explicitly addressed arbitrary displacement, 
which human rights law had failed to do). 
 45. See Guiding Principles, supra note 4, princ. 6(2) (“The prohibition of 
arbitrary displacement includes displacement: (a) When it is based on policies of 
apartheid, ‘ethnic cleansing’ or similar practices aimed at/or resulting in altering 
the ethnic, religious or racial composition of the affected population; (b) In 
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development projects are an acceptable basis for displacement in a 
case where a government can show great public need.46 Walter 
Kälin, the current Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General on 
the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, introduced a 
proportionality test to determine if a development project is 
acceptable under the Guiding Principles.47 The third and final section 
of Principle Six limits the duration of displacement—presenting 
another element of the proportionality analysis.48 However, this 
provision may cause difficulty in instances where displaced persons 
cannot return to their original place of residence.49
2. Proposed Benefits Relevant for a Principle 6(2)(c)  
Proportionality Analysis 
According to the Sudanese government, the Merowe Dam project 
proposes myriad benefits for Sudan and its citizens.50 Foremost is the 
Dam’s considerable power generating capability.51 At full capacity, 
situations of armed conflict, unless the security of the civilians involved or 
imperative military reasons so demand; (c) In cases of large-scale development 
projects, which are not justified by compelling and overriding public interests;  
(d) In cases of disasters, unless the safety and health of those affected requires their 
evacuation; and (e) When it is used as a collective punishment.”). 
 46. See Interview by Debbie Elliot, Host, All Things Considered, with Miloon 
Kothari, U.N. Special Rapporteur on Adequate Hous. (Sept. 2, 2007), available at 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=14130080 [hereinafter NPR 
Interview] (conceding that while often detrimental, large-scale development 
projects may displace people if those displaced can “continue with their 
livelihood”). 
 47. See KÄLIN, supra note 20, at 17 (positing that a state must prove the 
“compelling and overriding public interests” required by the Guiding Principles to 
meet the requirement of “necessity and proportionality”). 
 48. See Guiding Principles, supra note 4, princ. 6(3) (“Displacement shall last 
no longer than required by the circumstances.”). 
 49. See KÄLIN, supra note 20, at 19 (asserting that prolonged displacement 
contradicts human rights norms and inhibits finding lasting solutions to questions 
surrounding IDPs). 
 50. See Dams Implementation Unit, Merowe Dam Project: About the Dam, 
http://merowedam.gov.sd/en/location.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2008) [hereinafter 
About the Dam] (indicating that the electrical power from the Dam will allow new 
industrial projects, development of a fishing industry in the lake created by the 
Dam, improved access to groundwater through use of electrical pumps, and a 
higher standard of living for those around the lake). 
 51. See Dan Morrison, The Quest for Oil: China Invests while Sudan Wars in 
Darfur, U.S. NEWS, July 29, 2007, available at http://www.usnews.com/usnews/ 
news/articles/070729/6china.africab.htm (stating that, when fully operational, the 
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the Dam will increase the available electrical supply of Sudan’s 
power grid by 150%.52 Sudan lags behind the rest of the world, even 
the developing world, in availability of electricity, and the addition 
of the Merowe Dam will allow for much greater electrification.53
While the government of Sudan primarily cites electrical power as 
the reason for constructing the Merowe Dam, the government also 
proposes several other benefits, including flood control and irrigation 
of the arid land around the Dam.54 Floods are a major problem in 
Sudan,55 and in 2007, they affected half a million people in only 
three months.56 If the Dam works as planned for flood control, the 
water level downstream from the Dam will continue to vary 
Merowe Dam will produce 1,250 megawatts of electricity). 
 52. See Apiku, supra note 1 (determining that just the initial two turbines, 
producing 250 megawatts, will immediately reduce some of the strain on Sudan’s 
national power grid). 
 53. See FACT-FINDING MISSION, supra note 2, § 2 (revealing the degree to 
which Sudan is in need of electricity by explaining that in a nation of nearly forty 
million people, only 700,000 have electricity). Compare Central Intelligence 
Agency, The World Factbook: Sudan, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/ 
the-world-factbook/geos/su.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2008) (indicating Sudan’s 
energy consumption of 3.298 billion kilowatt hours (kWh) for a population of 
40,218,455 yielding only approximately 82 kWh per capita), with Central 
Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Egypt, https://www.cia.gov/library/ 
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2008) 
(indicating Egypt’s consumption of 84.49 billion kWh for a population of 
81,713,517, or approximately 1034 kWh per capita). 
 54. See About the Dam, supra note 51 (lauding the dam as a solution to 
Sudan’s slow economic and social development). 
 55. See American Red Cross: American Red Cross Presents Its Most Recent 
News and Research Developments, LIFE SCI. WKLY., Aug. 21, 2007, at 5945 
(warning that seasonal flooding typical in Sudan during the summer could affect 
up to 2.4 million people in 2007). 
 56. See Badru Mulumba, River Nile Could Displace One Million Sudanese, 
NEW VISION (UGANDA), Aug. 19, 2007 (reporting that flooding destroyed 30,000 
homes in Sudan and left an estimated 150,000 people homeless); FEWS South 
Sudan Food Security Watch Dec 2007 - Flood Induced Crop Losses Threaten 
Food Security, RELIEFWEB, Dec. 11, 2007, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB. 
NSF/db900SID/EDIS-79TS27?OpenDocument (noting that floods impacted an 
estimated 500,000 people between October and December 2007); FOOD AND 
AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, THE SUDAN: FLOODS FLASH APPEAL 2007 
(2007), http://www.fao.org/emergencies/tce-appfund/tce-appeals/appeals/emergenc 
y-detail0/en/?uidf=1426&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=1077&tx_ttnews%5BbackP 
id%5D=1388&cHash=a (proposing relief projects for Sudan following a season of 
devastating flooding). 
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radically.57 These variations will be predictable, but may cause 
problems.58 The Sudanese government presents irrigation as another 
benefit of the Dam, but experts are skeptical about the ability of the 
Sudanese government to implement such a program.59
C. THE BINDING INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE ICCPR AND 
ICESCR PROTECTS IDPS 
Sudan is party to both the ICCPR and the ICESCR, both of which 
historically have offered a limited degree of protection to IDPs.60 
The documents are entirely consistent with the Guiding Principles, 
and although they are general in scope, they apply to IDPs.61 Both 
instruments contain guarantees of rights implicated in any situation 
of displacement, such as an individual’s right to an adequate standard 
of living and the sanctity of the family unit.62 The ICCPR provides 
that citizens shall have freedom of movement and choice of 
 57. See CRISTIAN TEODORU ET AL., INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE MEROWE DAM PROJECT (NILE 
RIVER, SUDAN) 7 (2006), available at http://www.eawag.ch/media/20060323/ 
Independent-Review-20060323-Short.pdf (warning that the operational cycle of 
the Dam will create dangerous fluctuations in water levels downstream from the 
Dam, an occurrence known as “hydropeaking,” which “will have detrimental 
effects on aquatic ecosystems”). 
 58. See FACT-FINDING MISSION, supra note 2, § 6 (noting the destructive effect 
of fluctuating water levels on irrigation pumps downstream from the Dam, as well 
as the danger to people working along the river). 
 59. See id. § 3 (noting the contradictory statements given by Sudanese 
government officials as to whether the irrigation component of the Dam would 
move forward). 
 60. See UNHCHR, Status By Country, http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/new 
hvstatusbycountry?OpenView&Start=1&Count=250&Expand=165#165 (last 
visited Aug. 19, 2008) (confirming that Sudan is a party to both the ICCPR and the 
ICESCR, and both covenants entered into force on June 18, 1986); see also 
discussion supra note 25 and accompanying text (explaining that protection for 
IDPs has traditionally fallen under international instruments). 
 61. See generally MASSES IN FLIGHT, supra note 24 (providing an overview of 
the Guiding Principles as they relate to the ICCPR and the ICESCR). 
 62. See ICESCR, supra note 8, arts. 10, 11 (reaffirming the commitment of the 
states party to the convention to the right to family and the right to an adequate 
standard of living); ICCPR, supra note 7, arts. 6, 7, 23, 26 (recognizing the 
inherent right to life, freedom from torture and inhuman treatment, and equality 
before the law, and reaffirming that the family is the fundamental societal unit); 
see also PHUONG, supra note 29, at 40 (maintaining that the first concern for IDPs 
is their physical safety and right to life, but that all areas of life from basic 
necessities to education or work are adversely affected). 
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residence.63 Furthermore, the ICESCR provides for the right to 
education and the right to work.64 The ICESCR and the ICCPR 
permit limitations to these rights only in a very specific number of 
situations.65 The Guiding Principles echo many of these provisions.66
D. THE ROME STATUTE ALLOWS FOR PROSECUTION IN AN 
INTERNATIONAL FORUM OF THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR SOVEREIGN 
VIOLATIONS OF BINDING HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS 
The Rome Statute established the ICC as a response to the 
limitations of ad hoc tribunals used in the past.67 The Rome Statute 
prevents perpetrators of serious crimes, such as crimes against 
humanity68 or war crimes,69 from taking refuge in their state’s refusal 
to prosecute them.70 Article 7 of the Rome Statute enumerates acts 
that are crimes against humanity,71 and Article 7(1)(d) specifically 
 63. See ICCPR, supra note 8, art. 12. 
 64. See ICESCR, supra note 9, arts. 6, 13. 
 65. See id. art. 4 (requiring that limitations to these rights be both compatible 
with the rights and in the interest of the general welfare); ICCPR, supra note 7, art. 
12 (permitting restrictions only to preserve public order, public morals, public 
health, national security, or the rights of others). 
 66. Compare Guiding Principles, supra note 4, princs. 10-23, with ICESCR, 
supra note 8, arts. 6-15, and ICCPR, supra note 7, arts. 6-27. 
 67. See Philippe Kirsch, The Role of the International Criminal Court in 
Enforcing International Criminal Law, 22 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 539, 540-41 
(2007) (listing inadequacies and problems of ad-hoc tribunals such as the 
involvement of only a few states in their creation, their limiting geographic 
specificity, dependence on the international attitudes toward their creation, and the 
extensive delays and costs associated with their creation). 
 68. See Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 7 (defining crimes against humanity 
as one of a number of acts “committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against any civilian population”). 
 69. See id. art. 8 (setting forth the definition of war crime and an extensive list 
of war crimes, including directing military attacks against non-combatants). 
 70. See id. art. 4 (circumventing a state’s potential refusal to prosecute a 
criminal by defining the International Criminal Court’s scope of powers to include 
functioning on the territory of any State Party and, “by special agreement, on the 
territory of any other State”); see also Kirsch, supra note 68, at 540-41 (illustrating 
the problem of dependence on national courts to prosecute perpetrators of serious 
crimes when such crimes generally made the state’s judicial system the least 
willing or able to carry out such prosecution, often because the government itself 
was a party to the crimes, as in the cases of Rwanda and Cambodia). 
 71. See Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 7 (listing, inter alia, murder, 
enslavement and torture as crimes against humanity). 
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names forcible transfer of a population as such a crime.72 Article 
7(2)(d) elaborates on the meaning of “deportation or forcible 
transfer,” specifying that the perpetrator must force the displaced 
persons from a place where they are lawfully present, and the 
displacement must violate international law.73 The Rome Statute 
deems an act a “crime against humanity” only if the act passes a high 
threshold.74 The statute requires that any of the acts it lists as crimes 
against humanity be committed in “a widespread or systematic 
attack”75 and that those committing the act have knowledge of it.76
Article 13 of the Rome Statute gives jurisdiction over crimes 
committed by states not a party to the Statute.77 The U.N. Security 
Council may refer a situation in a non-member state to the ICC 
pursuant to the Council’s Chapter VII powers.78 The ICC requires 
such a referral because its jurisdiction is not universal.79 The ICC 
 72. Id. art. 7(1)(d). 
 73. Id. art. 7(2)(d). 
 74. See Darryl Robinson, Defining “Crimes Against Humanity” at the Rome 
Conference, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 43, 47 (1999) (observing that participants in the 
Rome Conference agreed that a strict standard for defining a crime against 
humanity was needed to prevent all inhumane acts from being considered “crimes 
against humanity”). 
 75. See Sylvia de Bertodano, Current Developments in Internationalized 
Courts: East Timor – Justice Denied, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 910, 919 (2004) 
(reiterating the importance of the “widespread and systematic” element as a 
requirement for an act to rise to the level of a crime against humanity in the context 
of the ethnic conflict in East Timor). 
 76. See Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 7(1) (requiring that the perpetrator of 
an act constituting a crime against humanity have knowledge of the act); see also 
YOUNG SOK KIM, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY OF THE 
ROME STATUTE 82 (2003) (clarifying that the term “knowledge” as used in the 
Rome Statue does not require proof that the perpetrator knew exactly what was 
occurring or specifically what the state policy was with respect to the act, but only 
that the perpetrator had knowledge of the act’s occurrence). 
 77. See Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 13. 
 78. See Philippe Kirsch & Darryl Robinson, Referral by States Parties, in THE 
ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 619, 
619-20 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter ROME STATUTE 
COMMENTARY] (discussing the ICC’s realization that unforeseen situations would 
confront it and its subsequent development of “trigger mechanisms” for 
jurisdiction, including the Security Council referral process). 
 79. See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT 61 (2001) (acknowledging two main objections to a court with 
universal jurisdiction: first, the potential that the ambitious nature of such a court 
would discourage its ratification, and second, the lack of legal rationale for a court 
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exercises complementary jurisdiction and will act only when the 
domestic courts of a country cannot or will not try those accused of 
committing a crime.80 Furthermore, in addition to the complementary 
aspect of the court’s jurisdiction, the concept of admissibility means 
that the ICC need not try every case over which it has jurisdiction, 
but only those it chooses to try.81
II. ANALYSIS 
Sudan is violating provisions of the ICCPR and the ICESCR and 
is implicating the Guiding Principles in the way it is undertaking the 
Merowe Dam project.82 Under Guiding Principle 6(2)(c)’s 
proportionality analysis, the project causes impermissible hardship 
for the IDPs.83 If Sudan does not strive to meet the standards set by 
the international instruments, the U.N. Security Council should refer 
the case to the ICC because the displacements constitute a crime 
against humanity, and Sudan is unable or unwilling to prosecute 
those responsible.84
with universal jurisdiction). 
 80. See John T. Holmes, Complementarity: National Courts versus the ICC, in 
ROME STATUTE COMMENTARY, supra note 78, at 667, 672-73 (stressing that states 
heavily favored complementarity over concurrent jurisdiction when establishing 
the ICC); Kirsch, supra note 67, at 543-44 (stressing that under the principle of 
complementarity, the ICC will not act until all domestic options have been 
exhausted, unless the state is unwilling or unable to prosecute). But see SCHABAS, 
supra note 79, at 67 (referring to the term complementarity as a “misnomer” 
because the ICC and national justice systems often work in opposition to one 
another). 
 81. Cf. SCHABAS, supra note 79, at 69-70 (discussing non-discretionary 
instances when the ICC cannot adjudicate cases, such as pardons or cases that have 
already gone before domestic courts); Giuliano Turone, Powers and Duties of the 
Prosecutor, in ROME STATUTE COMMENTARY, supra note 78, at 1137, 1153 
(observing that even where the issue is entirely discretionary, the prosecutor still 
must take the factors of the situation into account to avoid acting arbitrarily). 
 82. See discussion infra Part III.B (elucidating Sudan’s specific transgressions 
with respect to the ICCPR, ICESCR, and the Guiding Principles). 
 83. See, e.g., KÄLIN, supra note 20, at 18 (detailing the ways in which the 
proportionality test has been incorporated into the internal rules of international 
organizations such as the World Bank and the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development, including the requirement that alternatives to 
displacement receive careful consideration); see also discussion infra Part III.A 
(invoking the proportionality test when assessing the Merowe Dam project’s 
displacements). 
 84. See OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, FACT 
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A. THE BROAD LANGUAGE OF GUIDING PRINCIPLE 6(2)(C) 
PRESENTS A LOOSELY-DEFINED PROPORTIONALITY TEST THAT 
COULD ALLOW THE MEROWE DAM PROJECT TO CONTINUE 
DESPITE LONG-TERM NET DETRIMENT TO THOSE THE PROJECT 
DISPLACES 
Principle 6(2)(c) allows projects such as the Merowe Dam if they 
serve “compelling and overriding public interests.”85 Sudan’s need 
for electricity, which the government uses as the main justification 
for constructing the Dam, is legitimate.86 This is particularly relevant 
because Sudan currently is proposing several more hydroelectrical 
projects.87 Sudan can justify construction of more dams, which are 
notorious for displacing large numbers of people,88 by claiming the 
dams fulfill an essential need for the state and promote a higher 
standard of living for the displaced.89
Evaluating the Merowe Dam situation under Principle 6(2)(c) 
requires a proportionality test that takes into account the overall 
benefits of the project and the detriment to those the project 
SHEET: THE SITUATION IN DARFUR, THE SUDAN paras. 1, 31 (2007), available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/ICC-OTP_Fact-Sheet-Darfur-20070227_ 
en.pdf (last visited Aug. 19, 2008) [hereinafter FACT SHEET] (documenting the 
referral of the Darfur situation in Sudan to the ICC because the domestic 
authorities had failed to prosecute the crimes). 
 85. See KÄLIN, supra note 20, at 17 (conceding that large development projects 
“can contribute significantly to the realization of human rights” and that relocation 
is often necessary); see also NPR Interview, supra note 47 (recognizing that 
evictions must sometimes happen in the course of large development projects). 
 86. See Apiku, supra note 1 (quoting Sudan’s President Omar Hassan al-Bashir 
as saying, “[T]he amount of power currently being generated meets only a fraction 
of the requirements of the Sudanese people”); see also supra note 54 (calculating 
the kilowatt-hours per capita in Sudan and neighboring Egypt, revealing Sudan’s 
large relative power deficit). 
 87. See FACT-FINDING MISSION, supra note 2, § 2 (listing multiple planned 
power projects, including the construction of a thirty megawatt facility at an 
irrigation project and a fifty megawatt addition to an existing dam). 
 88. See, e.g., PHUONG, supra note 28, at 31 (estimating that the displacement 
resulting from the construction of the Three Gorges Dam in China will reach 
approximately 1.2 million people). 
 89. See Upendra Baxi, What Happens Next is up to You: Human Rights at Risk 
in Dams and Development, 16 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1507, 1509-10 (2001) 
(paraphrasing a World Commission on Dams report that calls dams a “necessary 
evil” and noting a general lack of parity in costs and benefits despite the positive 
aspects of dam construction). 
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displaces.90 Applying a proportionality test leads to the conclusion 
that the benefits the Merowe Dam creates do not justify the 
difficulties the displaced persons encounter.91 The irrigation 
component of the project proposed by the government of Sudan may 
not be feasible and will not operate efficiently if completed.92 Flood 
control is likely to be more effective but will still create hazardous 
peaking downstream from the Dam.93 The government of Sudan 
presents an inadequate relocation and compensation scheme.94 
Providing the displaced farmers with monetary compensation is not 
an adequate response.95 The proportionality analysis requires that 
 90. See Anne Perrault et al., Partnerships for Success in Protected Areas: The 
Public Interest and Local Community Rights to Prior Informed Consent (PIC), 19 
GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 475, 498 (2007) (reviewing cases in the analogous area 
of land-use rights of indigenous peoples and finding a need for proportionality 
between the rights of those affected and the action taking place in order to classify 
such an action as being in the “public interest”); see also OP 4.12, supra note 20, 
para. 2(a) (outlining an implicit proportionality test in which a state must consider 
“all viable alternative project designs” prior to proceeding with a project that will 
require involuntary resettlement). 
 91. See Ali K. Askouri, The Merowe Dam: Controversy and Displacement in 
Sudan, FORCED MIGRATION REV., Sept. 2004, at 56, 56-57, available at 
http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR21/FMR21full.pdf (last visited Aug. 19, 
2008) (denouncing the concealment of project plans, the failure of the authorities 
to consider the views of those the project is displacing, and the human rights 
abuses perpetrated against those protesting the project); TEODORU ET AL., supra 
note 57, at 5-7 (finding numerous points of concern resulting from the Merowe 
Dam project, among them sediment buildup in the Dam, which over time will 
substantially reduce the reservoir’s capacity). 
 92. See FACT-FINDING MISSION, supra note 2, § 3; Adrian Laycock Limited, 
Irrigation and Drainage, http://www.adrianlaycock.com/irrigate.htm (last visited 
Aug. 19, 2008) (noting that the land surrounding the Dam is “extremely hostile” to 
such an irrigation, placing “severe constraints” on the design of the irrigation 
scheme). Adrian Laycock Limited is the irrigation design consultant for the 
Merowe Dam project. Id. 
 93. See TEODORU ET AL., supra note 57, at 6-7 (recommending a secondary 
dam to combat the harmful and dangerous effects of the daily peaking the Merowe 
Dam will cause). 
 94. See Sudan Extends Merowe Dam Appeals Deadline to November, BBC 
WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Sept. 29, 2007 (bringing to light a delay in the 
compensation scheme in which the government of Sudan put off the payment of 
compensation and fulfillment of contracts by several weeks). See generally FACT-
FINDING MISSION, supra note 2, § 6 (delineating numerous social issues the 
relocations are causing, such as replacing fertile farmland with arid, desert land). 
 95. See Mehta, supra note 49, at 640 (disapproving of cash payments as 
compensation for lost land in cases of displacement of agrarian peoples as 
removing the social and cultural foundations on which agrarian societies are built); 
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those displaced enjoy a standard of living that is at least comparable 
to, and preferably superior to, the standard they enjoyed prior to 
displacement.96 Sudan’s actions concerning the disbursements and 
treatment of those displaced expose the inadequacies of the 
compensation program.97
The language of Guiding Principle 6(2)(c) suggests that it seeks to 
prevent states from using development projects to justify human 
rights violations.98 Thus far, the government of Sudan does not 
appear to have an ulterior motive of discrimination for the Merowe 
Dam project.99 In the absence of any such overtly negative 
motivation, the international community must evaluate Sudan’s 
actions using the proportionality test of Principle 6(2)(c).100 Similar, 
previous projects indicate that this analysis will likely conclude that 
the Merowe Dam project fails to provide sufficiently for the 
displaced.101
see also Perrault et al., supra note 90, at 507 (encouraging alternate, non-monetary 
forms of compensation when monetary compensation does not adequately address 
the impact of displacement). 
 96. See, e.g., OP 4.12, supra note 20, paras. 2(c), 6(b)(ii), 6(c)(i) (requiring that 
the state support those displaced by placing them in accommodations that, when all 
factors are analyzed, provide for a standard of living that is at least as adequate as 
that provided by their pre-displacement accommodations). 
 97. See Askouri, supra note 91, at 57 (decrying the Sudanese government’s use 
of violence against farmers who attempted to return to their homes upon realizing 
the inadequacy of the farm land in the relocation area). 
 98. See KÄLIN, supra note 20, at 17 (interpreting Guiding Principle 6(2)(c) as 
asserting that development projects cannot be a disguise for discrimination). 
 99. See UNHCHR Press Release, supra note 3 (recognizing that the immediate 
issues involving human rights protection arise from the implementation of the 
Merowe Dam project and not from its development). 
 100. See Press Release, United Nations, As Mideast Fighting Rages, UN Rights 
Experts Urge Parties to Protect Civilians (July 22, 2006), http://www.un.org/apps/ 
news/story.asp?NewsID=19279&Cr=Leban&Cr1=  (reinforcing proportionality’s 
role in situations where human rights law is implicated, including the protection of 
displaced persons). 
 101. See WORLD COMMISSION ON DAMS, DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT: A NEW 
FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION-MAKING 321 (2000), available at http://www.dams 
.org/docs/report/wcdreport.pdf (deriding large scale displacements for dams as 
having been a clear failure and recognizing the impact of large dams on human 
development); see also Mehta, supra note 44, at 635-36 (attributing problems with 
those displaced by dam construction in India to the failure of the Indian 
government to provide an adequate legal framework to deal with such issues). 
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B. THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN FAILED TO RESPECT THE 
GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND VIOLATED THE INTERNATIONAL LAWS 
THAT FORM THE BASES OF THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES IN ITS 
RELOCATION OF THE PEOPLE IN THE PATH OF THE RESERVOIR 
Displacement unavoidably violates the rights of those displaced.102 
The government of Sudan violated the right guaranteed in the ICCPR 
to choose one’s place of residence when it forcibly relocated those in 
the way of the project without proper consultation.103 The 
government of Sudan violated the right of the IDPs to work, which 
the ICESCR guarantees.104 The ICESCR further guarantees an 
adequate standard of living and access to an education, both of which 
the government of Sudan has violated with the poorly planned and 
executed displacements.105
Besides Principle 6(2)(c) discussed above, Sudan failed to observe 
other provisions of the Guiding Principles, beginning with an 
obligation to prevent and avoid internal displacement.106 The 
 102. See PHUONG, supra note 28, at 40 (recognizing that the emphasis in 
displacement is typically on ensuring fundamental rights such as the right to life, 
but noting that even when such fundamental rights are observed, being transient 
interferes with rights arising from everyday activities, such as the right to work and 
the right to education). 
 103. See Guiding Principles, supra note 4, princ. 7(3)(d) (requiring an attempt to 
include those the project will displace in decisions regarding their displacement); 
see also ICCPR, supra note 7, art. 12 (granting those lawfully located within a 
territory the right to choose their residence). 
 104. See ICESCR, supra note 8, art. 6 (protecting the right to work for all 
people). But see Philip Harvey, Human Rights and Economic Policy Discourse: 
Taking Economic and Social Rights Seriously, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV 363, 
379 (2002) (construing the ICESCR’s right to work provision as requiring a state 
party to the ICESCR to take steps to ensure the opportunity to work over time 
rather than to provide an immediate right to work). 
 105. See ICESCR, supra note 8, arts. 11, 13 (providing for an adequate standard 
of living, which includes food and housing, and the right to an education); see also 
FACT-FINDING MISSION, supra note 2, § 6 (linking an increase in disease in the 
resettlement areas with the closely spaced resettlement housing lacking adequate 
sanitation). Cf. Robert M. Cover, Obligation: Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social 
Order, 5 J.L. & RELIGION 65, 71 (1987) (contrasting the difficulty of applying an 
affirmative right, such as the right to an education, with those rights which restrain 
the government because affirmative rights require a party to provide the 
guaranteed item). 
 106. See Guiding Principles, supra note 4, princ. 5 (mandating adherence to 
international law to prevent internal displacements). 
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government of Sudan further failed to include those it displaced in 
the displacement and resettlement process as Principle 7 of the 
Guiding Principles requires.107 This is relevant because while the 
Guiding Principles are not binding, the ICCPR and ICESCR are 
binding upon signatory nations.108 The existing law of the ICCPR 
and the ICESCR forms much of the basis for the Guiding 
Principles.109 Sudan is a party to both the ICESCR and the ICCPR, 
and therefore Sudan is obligated to follow their provisions, and, by 
extension, the coinciding portions of the Guiding Principles which 
Sudan is violating.110 If Sudan respects the Guiding Principles, the 
indicative function of the Guiding Principles suggests that Sudan is 
respecting binding international law as well.111
 107. See id. princ. 7(3)(d) (directing state agencies to attempt to include IDPs in 
decisions concerning their displacement); see also KÄLIN, supra note 20, at 21 
(underscoring that similar requirements of fairness toward the displaced exist in 
other international instruments, such as International Labor Organization 
Convention No. 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples); Askouri, supra 
note 91, at 56-57 (condemning the government of Sudan’s failure to consult the 
displaced in the displacement and resettlement processes and its use of violence to 
suppress dissenters). But see Resettlement, supra note 33 (presenting a framework 
in which the government of Sudan purported to consult the displaced in 
displacement and resettlement decisions). 
 108. See Entwisle, supra note 43, at 371 (establishing the Guiding Principles’ 
foundation in binding international law adapted to address issues of displacement); 
see also DAVID A. KORN, EXODUS WITHIN BORDERS 90 (1999) (stressing that the 
drafters of the Guiding Principles deliberately avoided proposing a legally binding 
document to avoid the inevitable opposition and delay to the document’s release). 
 109. See THE OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS 
(OCHA), TRAINING ON THE UN GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT 
6 (Aug. 9-11, 2004), available at http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F0 
04BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/139DAA0B7F0BB71680257091004B7656/$file/Puntlan
d_workshop_report_2004.pdf (recognizing that the Guiding Principles are based 
on “international human rights law, international humanitarian law and refugee 
law” as outlined in conventions and treaties). 
 110. See KÄLIN, supra note 20, at 13 (noting that situations causing 
displacement are significantly less likely to occur if states respect international 
law). 
 111. Id.; see also Guiding Principles, supra note 4, princs. 1, 2 (requiring 
conformity with international law). 
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C. DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE ICC COULD FIND THAT SUDAN’S 
ACTIONS REACH THE LEVEL OF A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY, THE 
ICC IS UNLIKELY TO TRY SUDAN FOR COMMITTING A CRIME 
AGAINST HUMANITY 
By forcibly displacing people with the Merowe Dam project, 
Sudan is committing actions that the ICC could find to meet the 
requirements set forth by the Rome Statute for a crime against 
humanity.112 Similar situations in the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Yugoslavia indicate that a forcible transfer within a nation’s 
borders provides grounds for finding commission of a crime against 
humanity.113 Although Sudan is not a party to the Rome Statute, the 
ICC can still obtain jurisdiction over the perpetrators of the Merowe 
Dam displacements by a referral of the U.N. Security Council 
pursuant to the Council’s Chapter VII powers.114 It is unlikely, 
however, that the ICC will prosecute members of the government of 
Sudan for their actions in the Merowe Dam project.115 Although the 
ICC is investigating the situation in Darfur, the Darfur situation is 
distinguishable from the Merowe Dam displacements and does not 
necessarily indicate that the ICC will pursue those responsible for the 
Merowe displacements.116
 112. See Nicolai, supra note 28, at 815-17 (characterizing a comparable 
displacement in Zimbabwe as a crime against humanity); see also Rome Statute, 
supra note 10, art. 7(1)(d). 
 113. Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 532, 
533, 687-88 (Aug. 2, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/icty/krstic/TrialC1/ 
judgement/krs-tj010802e.pdf (finding, under the ICTY statute, that forcible 
internal transfers of Bosnian Muslims from an area of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
constituted “inhumane treatment” that amounted to a crime against humanity). 
 114. See Kenneth S. Gallant, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate and Jurisdiction to 
Prescribe in International Criminal Courts, 48 VILL. L. REV. 763, 784-86 (2003) 
(charging the U.N. Security Council with upholding “international peace and 
security” through the exercise of its Chapter VII authority and the Rome Statute). 
 115. See Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on Darfur, Report of the International 
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General 3-4 
(Jan. 25, 2005), http://www.un.org/news/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf [hereinafter 
Inquiry on Darfur] (evaluating the list of crimes observed in Darfur before the ICC 
admitted the situation). 
 116. Cf. Katy Glassborow, ICC Suspect Dealing with Darfur Crisis, INSTITUTE 
FOR WAR & PEACE REPORTING, June 15, 2007, http://iwpr.net/?p=acr&s= 
f&o=336362&apc_state=henpacr (emphasizing the severity of the crimes for 
which the ICC issued a warrant in the Darfur situation, including the coordination 
of “murders, rapes, torture, forced displacement and unlawful imprisonment of 
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1. Sudan’s Actions Constitute a Crime Against 
 Humanity under the Rome Statute 
The forced displacements resulting from the Merowe Dam project 
meet the threshold for a crime against humanity.117 Without adequate 
justification, Sudan forced the IDPs from homes in which they were 
lawfully present, meeting the requirements set forth in Article 7(2)(d) 
of the Rome Statute.118 The government of Sudan has knowledge of 
the displacements and is conducting them as part of a large scale 
program, meeting the requirements set forth in Article 7(1), 
applicable to all the named crimes against humanity.119 Furthermore, 
Sudan is committing a crime against humanity even in the absence of 
armed conflict, as international law bans crimes against humanity at 
any time.120
innocent civilians”). 
 117. See Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 7(1) (listing forcible transfer of a 
population, among other crimes, as a crime against humanity “when committed as 
part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, 
with knowledge of the attack”); see also Antonio Cassese, Crimes Against 
Humanity, in ROME STATUTE COMMENTARY, supra note 78, at 353, 360-65 
(presenting the specific elements of mens rea and actus reus needed for crimes 
against humanity under the Rome Statute). 
 118. See Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 7(2)(d) (“‘Deportation or forcible 
transfer of population’ means forced displacement of the persons concerned by 
expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully present, 
without grounds permitted under international law . . . .”); see also KIM, supra note 
76, at 563 n.223 (qualifying duress and coercion as meeting the requirement of 
force as used in Article 7(2)(d) of the Rome Statute and emphasizing that overt 
physical force is not a requirement of the article); Resettlement, supra note 34 
(noting the government’s implicit acknowledgement of the legality of residence of 
those the Dam will displace). 
 119. See Cassese, supra note 117, at 373-74 (recognizing the requirement in 
customary international law and in the Rome Statue that the displacements or 
crimes against humanity must be large scale). 
 120. See id. at 356 n.8 (listing sources confirming the lack of necessity for a 
connection between war and crimes against humanity found in the dicta of a 
decision of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and by 
the International Committee of the Red Cross); see also SCHABAS, supra note 79, 
at 22 (regarding the ability to try crimes against humanity during times of war or 
peace as an example of the evolution of the definition of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity). 
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2. The ICC has Jurisdiction over Sudan Despite Sudan Not Being a 
Member Party to the Rome Statue if the Security Council Refers the 
Matter Pursuant to Its Chapter VII Powers 
A criminal court that is unable to prosecute is not effective.121 The 
U.N. Security Council can refer the Merowe Dam situation to the 
Special Prosecutor pursuant to the Council’s powers under Chapter 
VII of the U.N. Charter.122 A referral of this type is appropriate 
because Sudan will not otherwise appear before the ICC.123 The 
Security Council has referred the Darfur situation, which is occurring 
within the same country, and this implies that the Security Council 
could refer the Merowe Dam situation to the Special Prosecutor as 
well.124 Furthermore, the Special Prosecutor found the Darfur 
situation admissible, which means the ICC could potentially find the 
Merowe Dam situation to be admissible.125 In contrast to the ad hoc 
tribunals that preceded the ICC, the ICC can try ongoing or presently 
occurring crimes.126
 121. See Madeline Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-
Party States, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, PEACE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ROLE 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 219, 219 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000) 
(arguing that ICC jurisdiction over states not party to the Rome Statute avoids the 
“dismal prospect” that the court would be unable to pursue its mandate as a result 
of a lack of jurisdiction). 
 122. See U.N. Charter, supra note 26, art. 39 (permitting the Security Council to 
intervene in instances of “any threat to the peace” or “to maintain or restore 
international peace and security”); see also S.C. Res. 1593, pmbl., U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005) [hereinafter Resolution 1593] (setting forth 
justifications for referring the situation in Darfur, Sudan to the ICC Prosecutor); 
Darfur Inquiry, supra note 28, at 5 (illustrating an instance in which the Security 
Council found a threat to international security and chose to intervene); SCHABAS, 
supra note 79, at 54-55 (underscoring that the ICC’s jurisdiction may be over 
subject matter, territory, individuals, and time). 
 123. See SCHABAS, supra note 79, at 54-55 (indicating the appropriateness of 
bringing a case before the ICC when the state cannot or will not); see also FACT 
SHEET, supra note 84, para. 28 (limiting the reach of the ICC to cases where the 
judicial system that should be prosecuting the crime has failed to prosecute or to 
pursue a good faith effort to prosecute the crime). 
 124. See Resolution 1593, supra note 122, ¶ 1 (referring the situation in Darfur 
to the Special Prosecutor). 
 125. Cf. Kirsch, supra note 67, at 545 (recognizing the reality that states will 
continue to be unable or unwilling to prosecute those responsible for crimes falling 
under the jurisdiction of the ICC). 
 126. See id. (recognizing the additional difficulties created by the ICC’s power 
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3. The ICC is Likely to Find Sudan’s Actions with Respect to the 
Merowe Dam Inadmissible, Despite Meeting the Requirements set 
forth by Article 7 of the Rome Statute for a Crime against Humanity 
The ICC is not obligated to prosecute a crime simply because it 
meets the requirements for jurisdiction, and it will likely refuse to 
take on this case of Sudan’s forced displacements.127 The Special 
Prosecutor and the ICC have discretion to hear or decline to hear any 
case, even if the ICC has jurisdiction.128 Admissibility maintains the 
high standard of the Rome Statute by allowing the ICC to choose 
which cases it hears.129 In the Darfur situation, the ICC chose to 
admit the case only after a commission found evidence of crimes 
to prosecute ongoing or presently occurring crimes in the areas of investigation and 
security); see also Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 11 (establishing ICC 
jurisdiction for any crimes committed after the enactment of the Rome Statute, 
with the implication that these crimes may be ongoing); Int’l Criminal Court, 
Report of the International Criminal Court, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/62/314 (Aug. 31, 
2007) [hereinafter Darfur Report] (describing past practices of the ICC in 
protecting witnesses and victims, including issuance of warrants under seal or 
delay of proceedings until the ICC is able to guarantee the safety of all those 
involved). 
 127. See SCHABAS, supra note 79, at 55 (explaining that the hard and fast rules 
of jurisdiction and the largely discretionary rules of admissibility lead to overlap in 
which the Court’s discretion stands to play a significant role). 
 128. See Kirsch, supra note 67, at 543 (stating explicitly that even if the ICC has 
jurisdiction it may not act because it is a court of last resort, making action 
inappropriate until all domestic remedies have been exhausted, and because the 
matter must hold sufficient gravity to merit ICC consideration); see also SCHABAS, 
supra note 79, at 55 (recognizing that the concept of admissibility of cases to the 
ICC is almost purely permissive, while the rules of jurisdiction are fixed, allowing 
no exceptions). See generally International Criminal Court, Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility, http://www.icc-cpi.int/about/ataglance/jurisdiction_admissibility. 
html (last visited Aug. 20, 2008) (recognizing that ICC jurisdiction is limited to 
states that have submitted to ICC jurisdiction, crimes taking place on the territory 
of states that have submitted to ICC jurisdiction, issues that have been referred to 
the ICC by the U.N. Security Council, and issues occurring after July 1, 2002, 
while admissibility is based on the principle of complementarity, thus limiting the 
instances in which the ICC will act). 
 129. See Eva Golinger-Moncada, Why The Case Against Chávez Will Not Be 
Heard In The Hague, VENEZUELANALYSIS.COM, Nov. 17, 2003, http://www.ven 
ezuelanalysis.com/analysis/225 (underscoring the importance of maintaining high 
standards of admissibility under the Rome Statute to protect the credibility of the 
ICC and to prevent it from becoming a “forum of baseless complaints by 
extremists”). 
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more serious than displacement.130 Seeking prosecution solely on the 
grounds of forced displacement distinguishes the Merowe situation 
from the Darfur situation, in which the Security Council found that 
the situation posed a threat to peace and security in the region.131
III. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Guiding Principle 6(2)(c)’s proportionality test presents an 
inadequate means of determining the acceptability of a development 
project.132 The United Nations should develop a framework that 
presents specific requirements for a project to continue. In the 
absence of such guidelines, the government of Sudan should strive to 
meet international standards already in place.133 If Sudan fails to do 
so, the ICC should admit this case and punish those responsible for 
the forced relocations. 
A. THE UNITED NATIONS SHOULD ESTABLISH A FRAMEWORK FOR 
DEFINING THE BALANCE BETWEEN NECESSITY AND HARDSHIP ON 
THOSE WHOM LARGE-SCALE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS DISPLACE 
IN ORDER TO CLARIFY THE MEANING OF  
GUIDING PRINCIPLE 6(2)(C) 
First, displaced persons should benefit directly from the displacing 
project. This is consistent with the language requiring a compelling 
public benefit and specifically applies the benefit to those 
displaced.134 A requirement of direct benefit would ensure that IDPs 
 130. See Inquiry on Darfur, supra note 115, at 3 (releasing investigation results 
revealing cases of murder, torture, rape, and disappearances of civilians in Darfur 
perpetrated by government forced and government supported militias). 
 131. See Resolution 1593, supra note 122, pmbl. & ¶ 1 (deciding that the 
situation in Darfur “constitute[d] a threat to international peace and security” 
meriting referral to the Special Prosecutor under the Security Council’s Chapter 
VII powers). 
 132. Cf. OP 4.12, supra note 20, para. 2(b) (providing more guidance on what an 
effective proportionality test should produce, including “sustainable development 
programs, providing sufficient investment resources to enable the persons 
displaced by the project to share in project benefits” and an opportunity for the 
displaced to participate in the implementation of these programs). 
 133. See KÄLIN, supra note 20, at 13 (suggesting that adherence to the Guiding 
Principles and international law is concurrent given the significant overlap between 
them). 
 134. See Guiding Principles, supra note 4, princ. 6(2)(c) (proscribing forced 
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receive some benefit promptly.135 In this situation, for example, 
Sudan should move the approximately 60,000 displaced persons to 
homes and communities that have reliable and extremely cheap 
electrical power.136 The proximity inherent in such a requirement 
eliminates some of the practical hurdles to implementing such a 
“direct benefit” scheme.137
Second, the government should improve the infrastructure in the 
relocation areas to provide for a net reduction in the poverty level in 
those areas, in contrast to the increase in poverty created by the 
relocations for the Merowe Dam project.138 The Guiding Principles 
and the ICESCR already include requirements for the adequacy of 
relocation housing.139 This is consistent with the direct benefit 
scheme discussed above as well. In this case, the government of 
Sudan cannot show that the substantial number of IDPs will benefit 
suitably to allow the project to continue, so the project should not 
continue despite a showing of benefit for the nation as a whole.140 
While requiring an adequate standard of living for the displaced 
relocation for development projects in the absence of a “compelling or overriding 
public benefit”); see also OP 4.12, supra note 20, para. 2(b) (requiring that projects 
involving relocation be sufficiently funded to provide benefits to the displaced). 
 135. Cf. Le Thanh Long, Vietnamese Water Resources Legislation and Legal 
Regulation of Dams: Viewed Through the World Commission on Dams’ Suggested 
Policy Framework, 16 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1631, 1689 (2001) (detailing an 
example from Vietnam where citizens were displaced to make way for a large 
hydroelectric dam project and over twenty years later still have not received 
electricity from the dam). 
 136. See About the Dam, supra note 50 (recognizing the main benefit of the 
Dam as the production of cheap and efficient electricity). 
 137. See Long, supra note 135, at 1637-38 (explaining that the “traditional top-
down scheme of decision-making” regarding dams and dam development fails to 
recognize that dams displace individuals who are often not the direct beneficiaries 
of the project). 
 138. See FACT-FINDING MISSION, supra note 2, § 6 (voicing concern that at the 
El Multaga relocation site, the poverty level has risen from ten percent to sixty-five 
percent in under two years). 
 139. See Guiding Principles, supra note 4, princ. 18 (guaranteeing “the right to 
an adequate standard of living” for displaced persons); ICESCR, supra note 8, arts. 
11, 12 (recognizing the right of all people to “an adequate standard of living” and 
“the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health”). 
 140. See FACT-FINDING MISSION, supra note 2, § 6 (illustrating the inadequacy 
of the government’s proposed compensation plan, which provides only four years’ 
earnings for date trees, which “can provide dates for up to 100 years,” and only 
minimal compensation for vegetable gardens). 
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cannot prevent governments from operating in bad faith, it would be 
effective in deterring governments from attempting to displace 
people in situations where supplying an adequate standard of living 
is impossible.141
B. THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN SHOULD STRIVE TO MEET 
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS IN THE RELOCATION OF THE IDPS 
THE MEROWE DAM DISPLACES 
In order to comply with international law regarding appropriate 
treatment of IDPs, Sudan should provide the opportunity for the 
IDPS to have an adequate standard of living by allowing them to 
maintain the lifestyle they had before displacement.142 Sudan should 
move the IDPs, who are mostly farmers, to areas where they are able 
to continue farming.143
Although providing appropriate accommodations for relocation 
will not absolve the government of Sudan of the other violations it 
has committed, it would greatly help Sudan comply with 
international law.144 Sudan should also make efforts to include the 
IDPs in any future decisions about their relocation.145
C. THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD RECOGNIZE FORCIBLE 
DISPLACEMENT AS A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY AND SHOULD 
PROSECUTE THOSE RESPONSIBLE 
Forced displacement is a crime against humanity, and the ICC 
should prosecute it even when the situation does not involve more 
 141. See id. (listing some of the inadequacies and problems of the resettlement 
site of El Multaga, including poor soil quality and a sizeable portion of the land 
unable to be cultivated because it is still covered with sand). 
 142. See NPR Interview, supra note 46 (explaining that continuity of livelihood 
is a significant factor in justifying and legitimizing large development projects). 
 143. See OP 4.12, supra note 20, paras. 9, 11 (warning of the complexity of 
relocating people with close ties to the land due to impacts on their cultural identity 
and encouraging sustainable strategies for resettlement that provide specifically for 
IDPs who depend on the land); see also FACT-FINDING MISSION, supra note 2, § 6 
(recognizing that farmers have suffered due to the forced relocations, as their diets 
and the quality of their products have deteriorated due to poor soil quality). 
 144. See supra Part II (discussing international law and possible violations). 
 145. See Guiding Principles, supra note 4, princ. 7 (requiring that those whom 
the government will displace participate in the planning concerning their 
displacement). 
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serious crimes.146 The U.N. Security Council should choose to 
prosecute in appropriate cases in order to avoid rendering forced 
displacement’s status as a crime against humanity a nullity.147 
Because of the existing crises in Sudan and the Security Council’s 
willingness to recognize the deficiencies of the Sudanese judicial 
system,148 the Merowe Dam situation is an ideal case for the Security 
Council to refer to the ICC.149 The Merowe Dam situation will not 
dilute the high standard that must be met to constitute a crime against 
humanity, as it meets every qualification in the Rome Statute.150
The ICC should admit cases when a government commits a crime 
against humanity that meets the requirements of the Rome Statute—
cases such as this.151 Specifically, the ICC should admit the case of 
the Merowe Dam project because there is no other appropriate forum 
and because it is not a frivolous case.152 The Special Prosecutor 
should take this case to uphold the function of the ICC as a court of 
last resort.153 The domestic courts will not prosecute the government 
officials responsible for the displacements, making this an 
appropriate instance for ICC intervention.154 The ICC and the U.N. 
 146. Cf. Glassborow, supra note 116 (including forced displacement in charges 
against a suspect in the Darfur crisis, but only in addition to crimes generally 
regarded as more heinous, such as murder, rape, and torture). 
 147. See Christine A.E. Bakker, Comment, A Full Stop to Amnesty in Argentina: 
The Simón Case, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1106, 1113 (2005) (discussing the duty to 
prosecute arising in international law from both customary and conventional law). 
 148. See Darfur Inquiry, supra note 28, at 6 (illustrating the weakening of the 
Sudanese judicial system resulting from significant strengthening of the executive 
and the failure to adequately codify human rights norms). 
 149. See UNHCHR Press Release, supra note 3 (presenting evidence that the 
government of Sudan is committing serious violations of civil and political rights 
in the execution of the Merowe Dam project). 
 150. See Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 7 (stating that a widespread 
“deportation or forcible transfer of population” qualifies as a crime against 
humanity). 
 151. See id. art. 1. 
 152. See Golinger-Moncada, supra note 129 (arguing that to maintain the level 
of international respect it commands, the ICC can and should refuse to hear 
frivolous cases or claims with no merit). 
 153. See Darfur Report, supra note 126, ¶ 2 (reiterating that the jurisdiction of 
the ICC is complementary in nature). 
 154. See Resolution 1593, supra note 122 (exemplifying a proper referral to the 
Special Prosecutor due to the failure of the national justice system in Sudan); 
Kirsch, supra note 67, at 540 (proffering historical examples of criminal 
government behavior protected by ineffective national courts). 
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Security Council should use this opportunity to make the statement 
that they will prosecute crimes against humanity, including forcible 
displacement.155 Consistent with the emerging notion of sovereignty 
as responsibility, the international community should intervene 
because Sudan is not willing to prosecute.156
CONCLUSION 
Large development projects can be acceptable bases for forced 
displacements.157 Sudan, however, is displacing those in the Merowe 
Dam situation in a manner inconsistent with accepted international 
guidelines. Sudan must comply with international norms and laws, 
and if it does not, the Security Council should refer the situation to 
the ICC for prosecution of those responsible. 
 
 
 155. See Nicolai, supra note 28, at 814-17 (illustrating a situation in Zimbabwe 
that presents a strong argument for ICC prosecution of forced displacement as a 
crime against humanity but has not been pursued by the international community); 
see also Zimbabwe Slum Evictions ‘A Crime’, BBC NEWS, May 23, 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6683619.stm (relating a study by two human 
rights groups finding that the situation in Zimbabwe meets all the requirements of 
a crime against humanity and should be tried by the ICC). 
 156. See FRANCIS M. DENG ET AL., SOVEREIGNTY AS RESPONSIBILITY: 
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA 15 (1996) (indicating that states can avoid 
international intervention by fulfilling their sovereign responsibilities, and in 
instances when they do not, the international community may intervene). 
 157. See Guiding Principles, supra note 4, princ. 6(2)(c) (allowing forced 
displacements when states undertake them for development projects that serve 
“compelling and overriding public interests”); see also discussion supra notes 85-
101 and accompanying text. 
